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Date

Jun 25, 2026

Location

Harbor Centre, Vancouver, BC

Deepdive 013 – The Blind Spot or Prospects for an Experiential Science

Topic

The Blind Spot - Prospects for an Experiential Science

Description

A MAC Group Deepdive – an in-person 2-hour investigation of the book The Blind Spot and how science can (and should) accommodate subjective experience.

Deepdive #013

This is a book-based reading group event.  Be prepared to order a copy ahead of time in order to read it.  If beyond your means OR you are getting to this too late, contact [email protected] to explore the options.

PRIMARY READING  The Blind Spot: Why Science Cannot Ignore Human Experience  ·  Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser & Evan Thompson  ·  MIT Press, 2024

Overview

Every scientific model has a built-in exclusion: the experiencer who built it. Modern science achieved its extraordinary power precisely by placing the observer outside the frame — treating nature as an object to be described from nowhere in particular. Yet nowhere in particular is not where any of us live. The cost of this exclusion, argue astrophysicist Adam Frank, physicist Marcelo Gleiser, and philosopher Evan Thompson in The Blind Spot (MIT Press, 2024), is a science that cannot account for the very condition that makes science possible: conscious, experiencing beings.

Deepdive #013 takes this provocation as its throughline: experience is not a residue to be explained away, nor an embarrassing exception to be quarantined in philosophy of mind — it is the missing variable that distorts models across physics, biology, cognitive science, and now artificial intelligence. Every item in the reading list below circles the same blind spot from a different angle. William James insists experience is the basic stuff of reality. Nagel shows that no objective description can capture what it is like to be something. Chalmers names the explanatory gap. Varela proposes a method for bridging it. Seth reframes consciousness as a controlled hallucination that is none the less real for that. And recent AI welfare research forces the question into institutional urgency: if we build systems we cannot assess for experience, are we reproducing the Blind Spot at industrial scale?

Framing Quotations

“Consciousness … is the one thing in the world of which we cannot know that the absence of it does not exist. Its presence is the only thing we can be absolutely certain of, and yet its nature remains the deepest of mysteries.”

— William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890)

“An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism — something it is like for the organism.”

— Thomas Nagel, ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ (1974)

“We are all hallucinating all the time; when we agree about our hallucinations, we call it ‘reality.'”

— Anil Seth, TED Talk: ‘Your Brain Hallucinates Your Conscious Reality’ (2017)

Six interlocking frameworks shape the evening’s inquiry, each addressing the missing variable of experience from a different disciplinary vantage point:

The Blind Spot (Frank, Gleiser & Thompson, 2024) — The founding move of modern science — placing the observer outside the frame — has created a systematic blind spot. Scientific knowledge is not a mirror of an observer-independent world but a co-evolving relationship between world and the experiencing beings who investigate it. Ignoring this produces not just philosophical confusion but concrete dead-ends in physics, biology, and climate science.

The Stream of Consciousness & Radical Empiricism (William James, 1890/1904) — Consciousness is not a chain of discrete events but a continuous flowing stream — personal, selective, and always changing. James’s mature position goes further: experience itself is the basic stuff of reality. Relations between experiences are as real as the things experienced, and the observer-independent world of physics is an abstraction built on top of this experiential ground.

The Hard Problem (David Chalmers, 1995) — Why should any physical process give rise to subjective experience at all? Functional and mechanistic accounts explain how the brain processes information, integrates signals, and generates behaviour — the ‘easy problems’ — but none explain why any of this is accompanied by an inner qualitative feel. No amount of third-person data closes this explanatory gap.

Neurophenomenology & Enactivism (Francisco Varela et al., 1991–1996) — Cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world but its enactment through embodied action. Varela’s methodological proposal: treat first-person phenomenological reports and third-person neuroscientific data as mutually constraining, not hierarchically ordered. This pragmatic bridge is the closest thing to a working method for a science that includes the experiencer.

Consciousness as Controlled Hallucination (Anil Seth, 2017–2021) — The brain is a prediction machine whose best guesses about the causes of sensory signals constitute conscious experience — including the sense of self. This is not an argument that experience is illusory but that its structure can be studied scientifically: by explaining what predictions the brain makes and why, we can progressively illuminate the hard problem from the inside.

Ancient Parallels: Upanishads & Buddhist Anatta (c. 700–300 BCE) — Two ancient traditions placed experience at the centre of cosmology and reached opposite conclusions. The Upanishads identify individual consciousness (Atman) with ultimate reality (Brahman): experience is the ground of being. Buddhism counters with anatta — no permanent self underlies the stream of experience. Both traditions insist the observer cannot be cleanly separated from what is observed, anticipating the Blind Spot argument by two millennia.

Recommended Reads

 

Items are grouped by medium: Books first, then Videos & Podcasts, then Academic Papers & Articles. ★ Recommended items are the highest-priority preparations; aim to engage with at least one from each group before the session.

Books

▸  The Blind Spot: Why Science Cannot Ignore Human Experience  ★ Recommended

Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser & Evan Thompson  ·  MIT Press, 2024

The anchor text. Frank (astrophysicist), Gleiser (physicist), and Thompson (philosopher, UBC) trace the systematic exclusion of the observer across modern science — from quantum mechanics and the arrow of time to the origins of life and the climate crisis — and argue that incorporating lived experience is not a retreat from rigour but a prerequisite for it.

▸  Being You: A New Science of Consciousness  ★ Recommended

Anil Seth  ·  Faber & Faber / Dutton, 2021

Seth’s central thesis: every conscious experience is a controlled hallucination — a prediction generated by the brain rather than a transparent window onto the world. The book bridges the hard problem and empirical neuroscience, arguing that explaining the structure of experience (rather than tackling consciousness head-on) is the most tractable scientific strategy. Named Best Book of 2021 by Bloomberg and The Economist.

▸  The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience

Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch  ·  MIT Press, 1991 (revised ed. 2017)

The book that introduced enactivism to cognitive science: cognition as the enactment of a world through embodied action, not the computation of a representation. Bridges phenomenology, Buddhist philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. Thompson’s 2017 introduction updates the argument in light of subsequent developments, including AI.

▸  The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI  ★ Recommended

Jonathan Birch  ·  Oxford University Press, 2024  ·  Open Access

Birch (LSE) develops a precautionary ethics for “sentience candidates” — beings whose capacity for experience is uncertain, including people with disorders of consciousness, brain organoids, and AI systems. His framework is directly applicable to the synthetic biological systems examined in Deepdive #012, extending that session’s questions into the domain of moral standing.

Videos & Podcasts

▸  Your Brain Hallucinates Your Conscious Reality (TED Talk)  ★ Recommended

Anil Seth  ·  TED, 2017  ·  17 min  ·  14M+ views

The best single introduction to Seth’s controlled hallucination framework. Covers the distinction between level and content of consciousness, the predictive processing model of perception, and the “beast machine” theory of the self. Required viewing for participants who have not yet read Being You.

▸  The Hard Problem of Consciousness (Closer to Truth interview)

David Chalmers  ·  Closer to Truth  ·  ~25 min

Chalmers explains the distinction between easy and hard problems in accessible terms, responds to major objections, and discusses why purely computational or functional accounts cannot close the explanatory gap. Valuable preparation for both the Chalmers paper and the AI consciousness debate.

▸  Evan Thompson on Enactivism and “Quantum Phenomenology” (Edge of Mind Podcast)

Evan Thompson  ·  Edge of Mind Podcast, 2022  ·  ~60 min

Thompson (co-author of both The Embodied Mind and The Blind Spot) discusses enactivism, the relationship between phenomenology and neuroscience, Buddhist no-self, and the prospects for a science that includes the experiencer. Conversational bridge between The Embodied Mind and The Blind Spot.

Academic Papers & Articles

▸  What Is It Like to Be a Bat?  ★ Recommended

Thomas Nagel  ·  The Philosophical Review, 1974  ·  PDF, free

Nagel’s landmark argument: no amount of objective, third-person information about bat brains or behaviour tells us what echolocation feels like from the inside. An organism is conscious if and only if there is “something it is like” to be that organism. The clearest statement of the explanatory gap and the most cited paper in philosophy of mind.

▸  Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

David J. Chalmers  ·  Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3), 1995  ·  PDF, free

Chalmers’s seminal articulation of the hard problem: why do physical processes give rise to subjective experience at all? He distinguishes the “easy problems” of cognition (discrimination, reporting, access) from the genuinely hard question of why any of this is accompanied by felt experience. No subsequent theory of consciousness can avoid engaging with this argument.

▸  Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem  ★ Recommended

Francisco J. Varela  ·  Journal of Consciousness Studies 3(4), 1996  ·  Online

Varela responds to Chalmers not with a theoretical refutation but a methodological proposal: build a research community equipped for rigorous first-person inquiry and treat phenomenological reports and neuroscientific data as mutually constraining. The most operationally concrete proposal for a science that takes experience seriously.

▸  The Stream of Consciousness (Principles of Psychology, Ch. XI)

William James  ·  Holt, 1890  ·  Online, free

James’s five defining properties of conscious thought — stream character, personal ownership, continuity, intentionality, and selectiveness — remain the most carefully observed phenomenological description of experience in the English language. The foundational text for understanding why experience cannot be reduced to a sequence of discrete states.

▸  There Is No Such Thing as Conscious Artificial Intelligence

Zimmermann et al.  ·  Humanities & Social Sciences Communications (Nature Portfolio), October 2025

A pointed counter-argument to AI consciousness claims: LLMs are probabilistic pattern-matchers operating on binary code and semiconductor switches; no amount of linguistic sophistication constitutes experience. The authors coin “semantic pareidolia” — the human tendency to project inner life onto outputs that merely simulate it. Essential challenge to the Birch precautionary framework and a necessary counterweight to the AI welfare literature.

All Readings / Watchings / Listenings

 

▸  Being You: A New Science of Consciousness

Anil Seth  ·  Faber & Faber / Dutton, 2021  ·  Book  —  Consciousness as controlled hallucination; predictive processing theory of self and world.

▸  The Blind Spot: Why Science Cannot Ignore Human Experience

Frank, Gleiser & Thompson  ·  MIT Press, 2024  ·  Book  —  The systematic exclusion of the observer from science and the costs of that omission.

▸  The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI

Jonathan Birch  ·  Oxford UP, 2024  ·  Book (open access)  —  Precautionary ethics for beings of uncertain sentience, including AI systems.

▸  The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience

Varela, Thompson & Rosch  ·  MIT Press, 1991 / 2017  ·  Book  —  Enactivism: cognition as the enactment of a world through embodied, experienced action.

▸  Evan Thompson on Enactivism and Quantum Phenomenology (Edge of Mind Podcast)

Evan Thompson  ·  Edge of Mind Podcast, 2022  ·  Podcast (~60 min)  —  Enactivism, Buddhist no-self, and the prospects for a science that includes the experiencer.

▸  Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

David J. Chalmers  ·  Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3), 1995  ·  Paper (free PDF)  —  Seminal articulation of the hard problem and the explanatory gap.

▸  The Hard Problem of Consciousness (Closer to Truth interview)

David Chalmers  ·  Closer to Truth  ·  Video (~25 min)  —  Accessible explanation of the hard problem and responses to major objections.

▸  Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem

Francisco J. Varela  ·  Journal of Consciousness Studies 3(4), 1996  ·  Paper  —  A working method for a science that treats first-person experience as data.

▸  The Stream of Consciousness (Principles of Psychology, Ch. XI)

William James  ·  Holt, 1890  ·  Classic text (free online)  —  Five defining properties of thought; the irreducible continuity of conscious experience.

▸  There Is No Such Thing as Conscious Artificial Intelligence

Zimmermann et al.  ·  Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, Oct 2025  ·  Paper  —  Counter-argument to AI consciousness: “semantic pareidolia” and the limits of simulation.

▸  What Is It Like to Be a Bat?

Thomas Nagel  ·  The Philosophical Review, 1974  ·  Paper (free PDF)  —  The explanatory gap: no objective description captures what experience is like from the inside.

▸  Your Brain Hallucinates Your Conscious Reality (TED Talk)

Anil Seth  ·  TED, 2017  ·  Video (17 min)  —  Introduction to the controlled hallucination framework; 14M+ views.

 

About MAC

Mind, AI & Consciousness (MAC) is a Vancouver-based reading group studying issues at the intersection of mind, artificial intelligence, and consciousness. The group brings together researchers, engineers, philosophers, and the genuinely curious to examine how emerging AI sheds new light on the age-old exploration of biological consciousness. MAC holds focused 2-hour deep dive discussions combining structure with organic exploration. Participants are expected to prepare through advance readings and actively participate. To join, email [email protected] or visit mac.bc-ai.ca