Deepdive 006 – Is AI a (type of) p-Zombie?
Topic
Is AI a (type of) p-Zombie?
Description
An event titled "Is AI a (type of) p-Zombie?" will explore the philosophical concept of p-zombies and their relation to AI, with discussions based on readings from Peter Watts' novels "Blindsight" and "Echopraxia." Attendees will engage in assigned questions about consciousness and its implications for AI, with additional resources including seminal philosophy papers and various media discussing the topic.
“The p-Zombie – a being that is atom-for-atom identical to a conscious being such as you and me, but it is not conscious.”
– David Chalmers
Meeting Format
All attendees will have read one of two novels – Blindsight and/or Echopraxia. Co-leads Loki and David will assign key questions to each attendee ahead of time – on book content related to the nature of p-zombies. Final discussion will address how AI may (or may not) be a (type of) p-zombie.
p-Zombie Basics
p-Zombie Readings
- Blindsight – Peter Watts (2006)
- Echopraxia – Peter Watts (2014)
See Primary Readings for links
Bonus Readings
- The 21 Second God – Peter Watts
p-Zombie Humor
Primary Reading(s)
Blindsight (2006): Peters Watts
- https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/48484.Blindsight
- https://www.audible.ca/pd/Blindsight-Audiobook/B0719FSSBB?source_code=ASSGB149080119000H&share_location=pdp
- Perspective: A science fiction novel from the (so far) 2-part Firefall series – first in the series, Blindsight: The exploration of consciousness is its central thematic element. The title of the novel refers to the condition in which vision is non-functional in the conscious brain but remains useful to non-conscious action.
- Other conditions, such as Cotard delusion and Anton-Babinski Syndrume are used to illustrate differences from the usual assumptions about conscious experience. The novel raises questions about the essential character of consciousness. Is the interior experience of consciousness necessary, or is externally observed behavior the sole determining characteristic of conscious experience?
Echopraxia (2014): Peter Watts
- https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/18490708-echopraxia
- https://www.audible.ca/pd/Echopraxia-Audiobook/B0719FVVPW
- Perspective: It is a “sidequel” to his 2006 novel, Blindsight, and the two novels make up the Firefall series. Echopraxia can be read stand-alone.
- Echopraxia explores topics like the nature of consciousness, and the actual need (or lack) for it in evolved creatures, the use of religion to advance knowledge beyond science, the existence of God as a virus that modifies the laws of physics, and the role that baseline (non-modified) humans can have in a society where everyone else is “augmented” in one way or another.
Seminal Philosophy Papers
Consciousness and its Place in Nature: David Chalmers
- Consciousness and its Place in Nature
- Perspective: Consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural world. On the most common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world.
- So it seems that to find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature.
The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies: Daniel Dennett
- Perspective: Just such a boon is the philosophers’ concept of a zombie. a strangely attractive notion that sums up, in one leaden lump, almost everything that I think is wrong with current thinking about consciousness. Philosophers ought to have dropped the zombie like a hot potato, but since they persist in their embrace, this gives me a golden opportunity to focus attention on the most seductive error in current thinking.
The Inconceivability of Zombies: Robert Kirk
- kirk2007-TheInconceivabilityOfpZombies
- Perspective: Ironically the philosopher who first introduced the term “zombie,” later argued for their impossibility in “The Inconceivability of Zombies” (2008). Kirk developed arguments showing that zombie scenarios contain hidden contradictions when their implications are fully explored.
The Anti-Zombie Argument: Keith Frankish
- Perspective: Keith Frankish developed a sophisticated response in “The Anti-Zombie Argument” (2007), arguing that if zombies are conceivable, then so are “anti-zombies” – physical duplicates that are conscious despite having no non-physical properties.
- This creates a logical standoff that neutralizes the zombie argument’s force.
p-Zombies and AI – Blogs
p-Zombie Podcasts & Debates
The Zombie Argument Against Physicalism, Explained
- Participant: Emerson Green
- Perspective: Could there be a quantum mechanical element to human consciousness? If so, could that allow a collective intelligence/consciousness in humans, like we see in termites? Could it save the plant? Is the fundamental element/property of consciousness be information?
Philosophical Zombies Explained | Philip Goff and Lex Fridman
- Participants: Philip Goff, Lex Fridman
- Perspective: An extract from the full Goff interview on the Lex Fridman podcast – focusing on the p-Zombie question
Technical Articles
Do Zombies Understand? A Choose-Your-Own-Adventure Exploration of Machine Cognition
- Authors: Ariel Goldstein, Gabriel Stanovsky
- Perspective: Recent advances in LLMs have sparked a debate on whether they understand text. In this position paper, we argue that opponents in this debate hold different definitions for understanding, and particularly differ in their view on the role of consciousness.